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NOTE
Unconstitutional State Special Laws: Is
Rational Basis Review the Rational
Solution?
City of Aurora v. Spectra, 592 S.W.3d 764 (2019).
Chloe Slusher*

I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, scholars, judges, and lawmakers have argued over the
role of the judiciary in striking down laws created by a democratically
elected legislature.1 This problem has come to be known as the
“Countermajoritarian Difficulty.”2
The famous Carolene Products footnote offers one widely accepted
answer to the Countermajoritarian Difficulty.3 It stipulates that the
judiciary should only invalidate laws that violate fundamental rights
specified in the Constitution, disadvantage discrete or insular minorities,
or undermine the political process.4 This approach promised judicial
deference and allowed the legislature to create economic regulations.5

*

B.A., University of Texas at Austin, 2020; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law, 2023; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review 2022–2023;
Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2021–2022. I would like to thank Professor
Bennett for his guidance, insight, and support during the writing of this Note, as well
as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.
1
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 61–
62 (1989).
2
The countermajoritarian difficulty describes the inherent tension between the
ability of the judiciary to exercise judicial review to strike down laws and principle
that democratically elected officials should create the laws. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–17 (Yale Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1986).
3
Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 68–69.
4
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
5
Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 68–69.
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Debates on this subject typically involve federal courts.6 However, the
Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in City of Aurora v. Spectra raises
these same issues on a state level.7
In cases like Spectra, Missouri courts have grappled with how to
interpret the Missouri Constitution’s special laws provision.8 Special laws
are statutes that benefit an individual as opposed to the public.9 Special
laws cases have created the same countermajoritarian issues that scholars
have struggled with for centuries.10 What amount of deference to the
legislature should Missouri state courts allow when reviewing special laws
that benefit an individual or locality as opposed to the public as a whole?
City of Aurora purports to solve this dilemma by reinforcing that
rational basis review is the correct standard for reviewing special laws.11
The court’s holding, however, is dangerously vague.12 When deciding
whether a special law survives rational basis review, the court has two
options.13 The court could ask whether the legislature has a rational basis
for including the specific class of persons that is in the law.14 If the court
took this route, there will almost always be a rational basis as to why the
legislature included the specific class. The court will have abdicated the
responsibility delegated to them by the Missouri Constitution to strike
down impermissible special laws by instituting a standard of review so
low that any law can survive.15 Instead, the court should have specified
that special laws are permissible if the legislature has a rational basis for
excluding a similarly situated group. 16 This standard of review would
strike the perfect balance between judicial deference to the democratically
elected legislature while allowing the court to inquire into whether the
legislature is unfairly giving out advantages to specific groups.
Part II of this Note describes the facts and holding of City of Aurora
v. Spectra. Part III gives a summary of the Missouri Special Laws
doctrine. Part IV reviews the reasoning of City of Aurora v. Spectra.
6

BICKEL, supra note 2, at 9.
592 S.W.3d 764 (2019).
8
Id.
9
Evan C. Zoldan, Legislative Design and the Controllable Costs of Special
Legislation, 78 MD. L. REV. 415, 422–23 (2019).
10
See Justin R. Long, State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 719, 742 (2012).
11
City of Aurora, 592 S.W.3d at 781.
12
See id. at 780–82.
13
Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc, 821 S.W.2d 822, 832 (1991) (en banc).
14
Id.
15
MO. CONST. art. III, § 40.
16
Blaske, 821 S.W.2d at 832.
7
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Finally, Part V suggests courts should ask whether the legislature had a
rational basis for excluding certain groups from the special law. This
strikes a balance between providing deference to the legislature and
allowing the judiciary to step in when the legislature acts in a
countermajoritarian manner, a function typically reserved for courts.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2012, the Cities of Aurora, Cameron, and Oak Grove, Missouri
(“Cities”) brought a declaratory judgment action against CenturyLink, an
internet service company, alleging that it had not paid all the required
license taxes owed under the Cities’ respective ordinances.17 The Cities
also alleged that CenturyLink failed to enter into right-of-way agreements
with Cameron and Wentzville and failed to pay linear foot fees under
Cameron’s right-of-way ordinance. 18 CenturyLink denied failing to pay
the taxes and linear foot fees.19 CenturyLink also denied being required
to enter into right-of-way user agreements with Cameron and Wentzville.20
Section 67.1846.1 of the Missouri Revised Statutes banned cities from
enacting linear foot fees but created an exception that allowed
grandfathered political subdivisions to continue their fees.21 The Cities
asserted that this exception allowed their linear foot fees to be
enforceable.22 CenturyLink claimed that the exception for grandfathered
political subdivisions was a constitutionally invalid special law under
Article II of the Missouri Constitution which prohibits any special law

City of Aurora, 592 S.W.3d at 770–71. The Cities’ ordinances included a
license tax on telephone companies. Id. A license tax is a fee paid to the government
for the privilege of being licensed to do something. There was also an ordinance which
required certain utilities to enter into a public right-of-way agreement. Id. A public
right-of-way agreement is an agreement that a city makes, typically with utility
companies, that allows the company to use city property to provide utilities. The last
contested ordinance was a linear foot fee which required fees for utilities using the
public right-of-way. Linear foot fees are fees paid to the city in exchange for the right
to use the public right-of-way. Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 771–72.
21
Id. at 772; MO. REV. STAT. § 67.1846 (2016). Under the statute, a
grandfathered political subdivision is any political subdivision that has enacted linear
foot fees on a public right-of-way user before May 1, 2001. City of Aurora, 592
S.W.3d at 772 n.4.
22
Id. at 772.
17
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where a general law could be made.23 CenturyLink claimed this law was
special because it applied only to certain subdivisions, and no other cities
could ever enter into the class included in the statute because of the date
restriction.24
The Cities moved for partial summary judgment as to the license tax
and the right-of-way agreements.25 The trial court granted partial
summary judgment, holding the linear foot fees to be constitutional and
ordering CenturyLink to pay the fees.26 The case proceeded to trial in 2016
on the limited issue of damages.27 After trial, the parties cross-appealed.28
Since CenturyLink raised a constitutional issue the appeal went directly to
the Supreme Court of Missouri.29 The Supreme Court held that the
legislature had a rational basis for the grandfathered political subdivision
exception under section 67.1846.1, and it was therefore enforceable and a
permissible special law under Article III of the Missouri Constitution. 30

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Special laws are statutes that benefit an individual or specific group
of individuals instead of the public.31 Many state constitutions include
prohibitions on specific types of special laws and include a provision that
does not allow a special law where a general law would work instead.32 In

23
Id.; MO. CONST. art. III, § 40 (29); MO. REV. STAT. § 67.1846 (2016).
CenturyLink asserted two more affirmative defenses. City of Aurora, 592 S.W.3d at
772. First, that the Cities’ claims were barred to the extent that they sought to collect
tax on services and revenue streams beyond what was permitted by the Cities’
ordinances. Id. CenturyLink also contended that Cameron and Wentzville’s user
permits created and impermissible mandatory franchise for use of the public right-ofway. Id.
24
Id. at 774.
25
Id. at 772.
26
Id. Before trial, the Cities filed for partial summary judgment again on the
basis of additional license taxes and back taxes. The trial court found in favor of the
Cities on both issues. Id.
27
Id. at 773. The trial court found for the Cities’ and declared each Cities’ tax
base for purposes of calculating the damages for unpaid taxes. Id.
28
Id. at 774. CenturyLink appealed on a claim that the trial court should not
have awarded the Cities’ linear foot fees since it is an unconstitutional special law. Id.
The Cities’ appealed the trial court’s determination of damages. Id. at 793.
29
Id. at 774.
30
Id. at 782 (referring to MO. CONST. art. V, § 3 (1945)).
31
Zoldan, supra note 9, at 315.
32
Robert M. Ireland, The Problem of Local, Private, and Special Legislation in
the Nineteenth–Century United States, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 271, 271 (2004).
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Missouri, according to Article III §40, judicial review is the mechanism
for determining which special laws are permissible.33 Allowing judges to
strike down special laws they deem impermissible because a general one
would be applicable potentially gives the judiciary a broad power to
override laws enacted by a democratically elected legislature.

A. The Principle of Judicial Deference
Since our country’s founding, the role of the judiciary in the United
States has been largely debated.34 The doctrine of separation of powers
dictates that the legislature’s role is to create laws.35 While in certain
situations, the judiciary has the power to strike down those laws, it should
only do so if absolutely necessary.36 Additionally, according to what is
known as the “Countermajoritarian Difficulty,” if the foundation of our
governmental system is democracy, unelected judges should not have the
ability to strike down laws created by a legislature elected by a majority
of the people.37
Ideas about what amount of judicial deference to the legislature is
appropriate have fluctuated throughout history.38 It is widely agreed that
judicial deference was at its lowest level during the early 1900s, known as
the Lochner Era.39 During this period, the Supreme Court articulated the
belief that it was the judiciary’s role to carefully examine legislation that
interfered with the freedom to contract.40 By scrutinizing economic
legislation, the Court essentially treated the freedom to contract as a
fundamental right.41 Since then, this judicial activism by the Court has
largely been renounced.42 Lochner is seen as part of the Supreme Court
“anti-canon” because unelected judges were substituting their values for
those of the democratically elected legislatures to protect rights that were

33

MO. CONST. art. III, § 40(30).
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 138 (1803); BICKEL, supra note 2, at 16.
35
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
36
See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178.
37
BICKEL, supra note 2, at 16.
38
See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177; see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905);
see W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
39
David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83
WASH. U. L. Q. 1469, 1472 (2005).
40
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 667
(6th ed. 2019).
41
Id. at 666.
42
Id. at 668–69, 672.
34
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not expressly protected by the Constitution.43 Additionally, post-Lochner
decisions held that the Court should defer to laws that regulate the
economy because the right of contract is not a fundamental right.44
The Lochner Era ended with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.45 Since
then, the widely accepted answer to the Countermajoritrian Difficulty and
the appropriate amount of judicial deference is found in the Carolene
Products footnote number four.46 The Carolene Products footnote states
that the judiciary should only invalidate laws that violate fundamental
rights specified in the Constitution, disadvantage discrete or insular
minorities, or undermine the political process.47 This approach promised
judicial deference and allowed the legislature to create economic
regulations.48

B. Development of Missouri Special Laws Jurisprudence
In 1875, after the first inclusion of a special laws provision in the
Missouri Constitution, courts immediately began to grapple with what
counts as a special law and which ones were permissible.49 When
reviewing whether a special law was permissible, courts first asked
whether there was a reasonable basis for the classification in the law.50
This standard of review was eventually renamed rational basis but asked
the same question.51 However, courts eventually altered the standard by
introducing the substantial justification test.52 City of Aurora resolves
these inconsistencies in the standard of review for special laws and
represents a return to early special laws doctrine.53 This section outlines
how the Supreme Court of Missouri has changed its view on special laws
and created varying standards of review over time.

43

Id. at 672–73. The anticanon are a small group of Supreme Court decisions
that have been widely recognized as mistakes. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125
HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011).
44
See id. at 673.
45
See generally W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 675.
46
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
47
Id.
48
Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 60–61.
49
See State ex rel. Lionberger v. Tolle, 71 Mo. 645, 649 (1880).
50
Miners Bank v. Clark, 158 S.W. 597, 599 (1913).
51
Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc, 821 S.W.2d 822, 829 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
52
See Dishman v. Joseph, 14 S.W.3d 709 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
53
See City of Aurora v. Spectra, 592 S.W.3d 764, 777 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
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1. Early History of Special Legislation
The term “special legislation” refers to statutes that benefit an
individual as opposed to the public.54 Special legislation made up eightyseven percent of state legislation passed in Missouri before 1859 and was
popular in state legislatures nationwide.55 Special legislation topics
varied.56 Many special laws benefitted well-connected individuals that
had the political power to ask the lawmakers from their county to grant
them a favor that a judge was unlikely to do.57 Other special laws
benefitted specific municipalities by giving them advantages that the
legislature would be unwilling to give to the state as a whole.58 Examples
included laws enacted to divorce couples, change interest rates at
individual banks, alter terms in wills and trusts, and create local tax laws
and special tax exemptions.59
The prevalence of special legislation caused legislators to spend their
time persuading fellow legislators to exchange votes for each other’s
special laws.60 Since special legislation did not apply to other legislators’
districts, many lawmakers voted for special legislation without
considering the merits of the bill.61 Effectively, individual legislators had
vast powers concerning every legislative matter that affected their
localities.62 The popularity of special legislation transformed the state
legislatures into countermajoritarian institutions, institutions that did not
respond to the majority in a democratic society.63 Instead, the laws passed
came only from the will of the wealthy elite.64 This allowed powerful
lobbyists and corruption to take hold.65 This phenomenon was prevalent

54

Ireland, supra note 32. Local legislation is a type of special legislation that
benefits specific localities rather than the state as a whole. Id. Typically, both special
and local legislation are governed using the same standards and the terms are used
interchangeably. Id.
55
Jefferson Cnty. Fire Prot. v. Blunt, 205 S.W.3d 866, 868 (2006).
56
Ireland, supra note 32.
57
Id. at 274.
58
Id. at 283.
59
Id. at 280–91; see generally Long, supra note 10, at 726.
60
Ireland, supra note 32, at 273–74; Long, supra note 10, at 727.
61
Ireland, supra note 32, at 274.
62
Id.; Long, supra note 10, at 726.
63
Ireland, supra note 32, at 274; BICKEL, supra note 2, at 9.
64
Ireland, supra note 32, at 274.
65
Ireland, supra note 32, at 274.
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in state legislatures across the country, and the public rarely received
notice of pending special legislation.66
Eventually, a movement to end special laws advanced from state to
state.67 By 1875, at the Missouri Constitutional Convention, there was a
“unanimous desire to provide against special legislation.”68 The delegates
felt that the practice had caused “neglect and prejudice of public
interests.69 As a result, the Constitutional Convention of 1875 included a
prohibition on certain special laws.70
Subsequent constitutional
conventions have continuously included the prohibition in the following
revisions of Article III of the Constitution.71 The special laws provision
of the Constitution banned certain categories of special laws.72 The
convention felt that judicial intervention was required to protect public
interests from the economic elite minority that had grabbed hold of the
legislature through special laws.73
The current version of the constitutional prohibition on special
legislation lists several specific categories of special laws that the
legislature cannot pass.74 The provision also states that the legislature
cannot pass any special law where a general law could be made
applicable.75 Whether a general law could be applicable is a judicially
determined question.76
66

Ireland, supra note 32, at 276.
Long, supra note 10, at 728.
68
5 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875 60
(Isidor Loeb & Floyd C. Shoemaker eds., The State Historical Society of Missouri
1938) (Statement of Mr. Priest).
69
2 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875 878
(Isidor Loeb & Floyd C. Shoemaker eds., The State Historical Society of Missouri
1920).
70
Jefferson Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. Ass'n v. Blunt, 205 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Mo.
2006) (en banc).
71
See id.
72
MO. CONST. art. III, § 40 (1)–(29).
73
See 2 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875,
supra note 69; Blunt, 205 S.W.3d at 869.
74
MO. CONST. art. III, § 40 (1)–(29). Some of the specific categories of special
laws that the legislature cannot pass include granting divorces, changing the venue in
criminal or civil case, and giving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds. MO.
CONST. art. III, § 40 (2)–(3), (10).
75
MO. CONST. art. III, § 40 (30).
76
Id. The Constitution also specifies that the legislature may not indirectly enact
a special law by partially repealing a general law. MO. CONST. art. III, § 41. The
Constitution also indicates that the government cannot pass a special law without
providing notice in the locality affected at least 30 days before the introduction of the
bill to the general assembly. MO. CONST. art. III, § 42.
67
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In 1880, the Supreme Court of Missouri explained the difference
between special and general laws.77 In State ex rel. Lionberger v. Tolle,
the court stated that a statute that refers to persons or things as a class is a
general law.78 In contrast, a statute related to specific persons or things of
a class, regardless of how many, is special.79 A few years later, in Humes
v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., the Supreme Court of Missouri revisited the issue
and stated that “class legislation is not necessarily obnoxious to the
constitution.”80 The court further clarified what counts as a special law
holding that a legislative act that applies to all people who are or who may
come into similar situations and circumstances is not special.81 Art. III,
Sec. 40 asserts that the question of whether a law is special is a question
for the courts.82 However, the Humes court specified that courts should
approach the striking down of legislative acts with caution and that the
ballot box better corrects the errors of the legislative body.83

2. The Introduction of Reasonable Basis Review
The Supreme Court of Missouri continued employing both Humes
and Lionsberger when determining whether a law was a permissible
“special” law until 1914 when it decided Miners Bank v. Clark.84 The
court did not abandon the previous definitions but instead added to them
by announcing the reasonable basis standard.85 The reasonable basis
standard asks whether the legislature had a reasonable basis for creating
the special law.86 If it did, the law is a permissible special law.87 In Miners,
the statute in question allowed certain property owners to object to street
paving without giving other property owners who did not live in the area
that right.88 The court found that this special law was acceptable under the
Constitution because there was a reasonable basis for including only
landowners who owned property in the area to be paved. 89 In City of
77

State ex rel. Lionberger v. Tolle, 71 Mo. 645, 650 (1880).
Id.
79
Id.
80
Humes v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 82 Mo. 221, 231 (1884).
81
Id.
82
MO. CONST. art. III, § 40 (30).
83
Humes, 82 Mo. at 231–32.
84
Miners Bank v. Clark, 158 S.W. 597 (Mo. 1913).
85
Id. at 599.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
78
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Springfield v. Stevens, the court upheld a law prohibiting taxi cab drivers
from possessing or transporting alcoholic beverages.90 Even though the
law was special since it excluded other vehicles used for transportation of
passengers, the court upheld the law because it included all who were
similarly situated, and there was a reasonable basis for the classification.91
The McKaig v. Kansas City court overturned a law that prohibited
automobile sellers from keeping their place of business open on Sundays.92
As in City of Springfield, the court looked at the larger class of which
automobile sellers were a part, which included sellers of all other
merchandise, and asked whether there was a reasonable basis to exclude
the rest of the class.93 The court found no reasonable basis for singling out
people who sold automobiles and excluding those who sold other
machines.94 McKaig emphasized the importance of questioning the
suitability of those excluded from the law.95 According to the justices, it
is not what a law includes that makes it special but what it excludes.96
In 1991, Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth asked the Supreme Court of
Missouri whether a statute of repose was an impermissible special law.97
The statute specifically protected architects and engineers from liability
arising out of an unsafe condition of any improvement made on real
property.98 The plaintiff challenged the law under both the Missouri
special laws constitutional provision and as a violation of federal equal
protection.99 The court held that the statute of repose was a permissible
special law and did not violate equal protection.100 The court noted the
similarity of special laws doctrine to federal equal protection law in
circumstances where neither a fundamental right nor suspect class is
involved.101 When neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is
involved, the appropriate standard of review is rational basis to determine

90

City of Springfield v. Stevens, 216 S.W. 2d 450, 455 (Mo. 1949) (en banc).
Id. (The court specified that when analyzing special laws and whether a
general law could be made applicable under § 40, there is a presumption that the law
is constitutional, which a party challenging the law must overcome).
92
McKaig v. Kansas City, 256 S.W. 2d 815, 817–18 (Mo. 1953) (en banc).
93
Id. at 818.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 817.
96
Id.
97
Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 829.
91
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whether a special law is permissible or not.102 The justices continued to
employ the substance of the reasonable basis test but added equal
protection language to institute rational basis review for special laws.103
According to Blaske, the test for whether special legislation is permissible
is whether there is a rational basis for the legislature’s distinction.104

3. The Shift to Substantial Justification Test
Eventually, the court altered rational basis review and added the
substantial justification test for special legislation cases.105 This test
created a tiered standard of review that essentially found all special laws
that were based on close ended characteristics to be impermissible. 106
Under this test, courts first ask whether the classification in the special law
is based on open-ended or close-ended characteristics.107 A law is openended if others may fall into the classification.108 An example of an openended classification is one based on population because as cities shrink or
grow, they can fall into or out of a class.109 A law that is based on openended characteristics is not facially special and is presumed to be
constitutional.110 Once a law is presumed to be constitutional, rational
basis review is used.111 To meet rational basis review, the party
challenging the statute’s constitutionality must show that the classification
is arbitrary and has no rational relationship to a legislative purpose.112 A
classification that focuses on immutable characteristics is close-ended.113
102

Id.
Id.
104
Id. The court found there was a rational basis for the statute in question in
Blaske. Id. at 831.
105
See City of Saint Louis v. State, 382 S.W.3d 905, 915 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
Rational basis review was not completely abandoned by the court and was used in
Blaske. Blaske, 821 S.W.2d at 829. However, in the cases directly before and after
Blaske, the court used alternative tests. Other than in Blaske, the court did not return
to rational basis until City of Aurora. City of Aurora v. Spectra, 592 S.W.3d 764, 781
(Mo. 2019) (en banc).
106
See, e.g., City of Saint Louis, 382 S.W.3d at 914; City of Normandy v.
Greitens, 518 S.W.3d 183, 191 (Mo. 2017) (en banc); Jefferson Cnty. Fire Prot. Dists.
Ass’n v. Blunt, 205 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Mo. 2006).
107
City of Saint Louis, 382 S.W.3d at 914.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
See id. at 915.
112
Id.
113
Tillis v. City of Branson, 945 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
103
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Examples of close-ended characteristics include historical facts,
geography, or constitutional status.114 A constitutional status is a status set
out for a group in the Missouri Constitution. 115 An example of a status
set out in the Missouri Constitution is that the Highway Department is a
part of the executive branch of government as opposed to the legislative.116
If a statute is based on close-ended characteristics, it is presumed to be
unconstitutional since others cannot enter and leave the group.117 The
burden shifts to the party defending the statute to demonstrate substantial
justification for the special treatment.118 In creating the tiered standard of
review, the court implicitly conflated the question of whether a
classification is based on close or open-ended characteristics with the
initial determination of whether the law was special. In most cases, if the
law was based on close-ended characteristics, it would be overturned as an
impermissible special law.119 In contrast, if the law was based on openended characteristics, it would survive review regardless of whether the
law was special.120
The beginnings of this test can be traced back to Walters v. City of
Saint Louis.121 Under Walters, legislation that is specific to cities with a
certain population size is not special.122 “So long as it applies to all within,
or that may come within, the enumerated class during its effective period”
it is not special legislation.123 The court called this the rule of openendedness.124
The court reasoned that classifications based on population and the
rule of open-endedness allowed the legislature to address unique problems
of cities of certain sizes.125 Cities that grow or shrink could be brought
into the new classification and have legislation already tailored to the

114

City of Saint Louis, 382 S.W.3d at 914.
Kasch v. Dir. of Revenue, State of Mo., 18 S.W.3d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
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See, e.g., City of Saint Louis, 382 S.W.3d at 914; City of Normandy v.
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Ass’n v. Blunt, 205 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Mo. 2006).
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See, e.g., City of Saint Louis, 382 S.W.3d at 914; City of Normandy, 518
S.W.3d at 191; Blunt, 205 S.W.3d at 870.
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needs of that population size.126 According to Walters, the logical
conclusion must be that classifications based on population are openended, so the rule of open-endedness applies.127 Therefore, the statute is a
general law, even when it appears that practically no other city will come
within that population classification.128 The court then concluded that
when a statute is open-ended the correct level of review is rational basis.129
Next, Airway Drive-In Theatre Co. v. City of St. Ann introduced the
term substantial justification.130 This case reviewed the constitutionality
of a license tax under a different provision of the Missouri Constitution. 131
The Supreme Court of Missouri deemed the tax to be unconstitutional
because it was arbitrary and not substantially justified.132 The phrase
substantial justification was then used in the dissenting opinion of an equal
protection case. The dissent equated substantial justification with rational
basis.133 After Walters and Airway, the court frequently used both
substantial justification and open versus close-ended language in special
laws cases while maintaining reasonable basis language of earlier cases
without instituting a clear standard of review.134
In 1993, O’Reilly v. City of Hazelwood combined all of these cases
to create new doctrine in the form of the completed substantial justification
test.135 The statute at issue allowed any first-class county with a charter
government that adjoined a city not within a county to create a boundary
commission for annexation.136 The City of Hazelwood and St. Louis
County created a boundary commission to annex the unincorporated areas
around them.137 In response, O’Reilly sued claiming that the law was an
impermissible special law because the only county that met the statute’s
specification was St. Louis County. The court declared the statute
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130
Airway Drive-In Theatre Co. v. City of St. Ann, 354 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Mo.
1962) (en banc).
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1987) (en banc).
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See, e.g., Airway, 354 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. 1962) (en banc); Walters, 259
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136
Id.
137
Id. at 98.
127

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 2 [], Art. 13

702

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

unconstitutional.138 The law was based on close-ended characteristics, and
St. Louis County did not show substantial justification for why the statute
included certain counties while excluding other similar counties.139
The open versus close test was modified for the final time in Jefferson
County Fire Protection v. Blunt.140 The court stated that in certain
situations, a narrow population range can be considered a close-ended
classification and therefore presumed to be a special law requiring
substantial justification.141 In Jefferson County Fire Protection, the statute
did not allow certain fire protection districts to adopt fire protection codes
for home construction.142 The statute applied to fire protection districts
with more than 198,000 but fewer than 199,200 inhabitants. According to
the court, the rationale found in Walters for classifying population as openended fails where the classification is so narrow that others practically will
never fall into it.143
The court provided a three-prong test to overcome the presumption
that a population-based classification is constitutional.144
The
presumption is overcome if (1) a statute contains a population
classification that includes only one political subdivision, (2) other
political subdivisions are similar in size to the targeted political
subdivision, yet are not included, and (3) the population range is so narrow
that the only apparent reason for the narrow range is to target a particular
political subdivision and to exclude all others.145 If all three elements of
this test are met, the law is not presumed to be constitutional, and those
defending the law must show substantial justification for the
classification.146
In the past sixty years, the transition to combining the traditional
rational basis review with substantial justification to create new doctrine
seemed to be cemented as the special laws test. However, in City of
Aurora v. Spectra, the court abandoned the substantial justification test
and returned to the traditional rational basis review.147
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In City of Aurora, the Supreme Court of Missouri re-instituted
rational basis review for special laws cases.148 The court decided whether
CenturyLink should be forced to pay the linear foot fees under the city of
Cameron’s right-of-way ordinance.149 CenturyLink argued that such fees
were prohibited by statute and the exemption that purported to allow the
fees under 67.1846.1 was a constitutionally invalid special law.150 To
decide whether the exemption allowing linear foot fees was an
unconstitutional special law, the court first analyzed the threshold
requirement of whether the statute was a special law in the first place.151
If a statute is not a special law, neither the notice requirement under Article
III, Section 42 nor the specific prohibitions under Article III, Section 42
subdivisions 1-30 apply.152
In her opinion, Judge Breckenridge accepted the Humes test that “a
statute which relates to persons or things as a class is a general law, while
a statute which relates particular persons or things of a class is special, and
that classification does not depend on numbers.”153 Judge Breckenridge
also acknowledged that special legislation is not necessarily obnoxious to
the constitution.154
According to the majority, a legislative act that applies to all persons
who are or may come into similar situations and circumstances is not a
special law.155 The court endorsed the historical view that if a reasonable
basis supports the criteria for a class in a statute, then the statute is not a
special law, and therefore the constitutional analysis can stop there.156
Judge Breckenridge held that the Supreme Court of Missouri correctly
adopted reasonable basis review in 1913.157 The opinion explicitly
analogized the special laws review to equal protection rational basis
doctrine.158
The majority recognized that the rational basis analysis had
diminished over the years and that the substantial justification test had
148
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Id. at 771.
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Id. at 776.
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Id.; see supra notes 74–76.
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Id. at 776 (citing State ex rel. Lionberger v. Tolle, 71 Mo. 645, 650 (1880)).
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Id. (citing Humes v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 82 Mo. 221, 230 (1884)).
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gained traction.159 The court stated that incorrect distinctions between
open-ended and close-ended criteria had been made in the past.160
According to Judge Breckenridge, the last step in the wrong direction was
taken when the court placed the burden of presenting evidence of
substantial justification on the party defending the statute.161
The expansion of the analysis to encompass whether a statute’s
classification is based on open or close-ended criteria and to require
substantial justification does not “comport with the plain language of
Article III, Section 40.162 According to the court, the correct reading of
Article III, Section 40 does not suggest that certain special laws are
presumptively invalid.163 Therefore, the idea that such presumption can
be overcome if the classification is supported by substantial justification
is also wrong.164
Instead, the court asserted that every law is entitled to a presumption
of validity under the constitution.165 If the classification drawn by the
legislature is supported by a rational basis, the law is not considered
special and the analysis ends.166 If there is no rational basis for the
classification, the threshold requirement for Article III, Section 40 is met
and the party challenging the statute must show the second element of the
test.167 The second question asks whether the law violates one of the
specific prohibitions on special laws in Article III, Section 40,
subdivisions 1 through 29 or if the law is one where a general law can be
made applicable under subdivision 30.168 The court clearly stated that a
law will be presumed valid and the burden of showing both elements will
ordinarily reside with the party challenging the statute.169
The court went on to explain that by shifting the burden of proof to
the party defending the law to show substantial justification, courts had
turned the burden of persuasion that normally applies to a party charged
with showing a lack of rational basis in a constitutional context into a
mandatory requirement for the production of evidence to defeat summary
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judgment.170 According to the court, this burden shifting unnecessarily
heightens the level of scrutiny used in the threshold determination of
whether a statute is a special law.171 Judge Breckenridge noted that this
heightened level of scrutiny blurs the line between the threshold
requirement of whether a statute is a special law in the first place and
whether it is a special law that is unconstitutional.172 Instead, the court
must first decide whether the law is special and then move to the question
of whether it is a special law that is impermissible.173 The court explicitly
overturned the substantial justification doctrine by stating that the burdenshifting and the substantial justification test have no basis in Article III,
sections 40–42, and should no longer be followed.174 According to the
majority, the court should return to rational basis review.175
The court then went on to apply rational basis review to the linear
foot fees.176 The exemption under section 67.1846.1 that claims to allow
linear foot fees does not apply to all subdivisions.177 Instead, the provision
excludes any subdivision that enacted linear foot fees after May 1, 2001.178
The court noted that normally, the party defending the constitutional
validity of a statute under rational basis review does not bear the burden
of proof at trial.179 However, because the Cities moved for summary
judgment, they bore the burden of showing the provision was supported
by a rational basis.180
Under rational basis review, the court will uphold the statute if it finds
a “reasonably conceivable state of facts that provide a rational basis for
the classifications.”181 Finding a rational basis is an objective inquiry that
does not depend on the legislature’s subjective intent in creating the
classification.182 Judge Breckenridge clarified that whether the statute is
based on open-ended or close-ended criteria can shed light on whether
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there is a rational basis for the classification, but it does not decide the
issue.183
Here, the court found that cities have likely chosen not to pursue
revenue from other sources by enacting linear foot fees. 184 Existing
revenue would be lost without the provision allowing linear foot fees to
continue if they were enacted before May 1, 2001.185 Protecting previous
sources of revenue for subdivisions that enacted linear foot fees before
May 1, 2001 supports a rational basis for creating the classification.186
This classification balances the reasonable reliance of the subdivisions that
chose linear foot fees to raise revenue when doing so was lawful with the
legislature’s motive to implement a policy that stops cities from continuing
the use of that method of raising revenue.187 That balance was a logical
effort to create new policy without disrupting those which prompted the
legislature to enact linear foot fees before the change in policy, and
therefore 67.184.1 is not a special law.188

V. COMMENT
After Spectra, the standard of review for special laws is rational
basis.189 While the court did clarify uncertainty in special laws doctrine,
the holding falls short. Rational basis could potentially be used to
effectively interpret the Missouri special laws provision out of the
constitution. To give the effect to the provision while balancing judicial
review, the court should have clarified that the standard of review for
special laws is whether the legislature had a rational basis for the class that
was excluded from the special law.190
Rational basis is a low standard. This raises the question of whether
such a low standard of review would make the prohibition on special laws
ineffective since almost any law can survive review.191 If the prohibition
no longer has effect, the judiciary could be seen as abdicating the
responsibility constitutionally delegated to the court in the special laws
provision of the Missouri Constitution.
183
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Special laws doctrine must strike a balance between allowing the
judiciary to step in when the legislature has acted in a countermajoritarian
manner by enacting a special law unfairly benefiting a single group while
still observing judicial deference to the elected legislature. Special laws
provisions were enacted into many state constitutions in the late 1800s as
a reaction to wealthy, well-organized institutions with narrow preferences
dominating the legislative process.192 The movement towards restricting
special laws aimed to protect the democratic process from the capture of
elite economic minorities.193 According to the historical context of the
special laws provision, the role of courts should be to intervene when
powerful minorities are receiving unfair advantages in the legislative
process.194 Judicial review of statutes and ordinances created by elected
bodies raises countermajoritarian concerns.195 However, special laws raise
their own countermajoritarian concerns as they go against the majority to
benefit a specific group.196
At the same time, the legislature needs the ability to address the
specific needs of certain groups.197 The role of the courts is not to usurp
legislative power with judicial activism.198 The Missouri Constitutional
Convention did not envision a system where courts use special laws
doctrine to insert their own beliefs and override the will of the elected
legislature.199 In fact, the concerns that gave rise to the enactment of
special laws provisions were rooted in the idea that legislation should be
based on a will of the majority of the people and not directed toward an
elite minority.200 If too much power is given to judges to strike down
special laws, the purpose of the special laws provision to protect the
majority from an elite minority will be defeated and instead the power will
have gone from one elite minority to another. Therefore, a special laws
test which provides a certain level of deference to the legislature elected
by the people is most appropriate.
The substantial justification test previously used by the court is
problematic because it creates a heightened level of review for special laws
which are mainly economic regulations. The substantial justification test
192
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mirrors the immutable characteristics doctrine of equal protection. 201
Under federal equal protection doctrine, statutes that classify based on
immutable characteristics such as race and gender are given a heightened
standard of review by courts.202 Similarly, the substantial justification
doctrine affords statutes that classify based on close-ended characteristics
a heightened standard of review of substantial justification.203 Immutable
characteristics create the same concern that close-ended characteristics
do.204 Immutable characteristics are concerning in equal protection
jurisprudence because they are characteristics that attach themselves to an
individual, are often part of their identity and cannot easily be changed.205
Similarly, close-ended characteristics such as historical facts, geography,
or constitutional status attach themselves to the thing being regulated and
are not easily changed.206
The issue with treating close-ended characteristics in a manner
similar to immutable characteristics is that special laws prohibitions are
for the most part meant to regulate economic interests.207 Whenever the
judiciary strikes down a law created by a democratic legislature, the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty is raised.208 Carolene Products offers an
answer to that difficulty by reserving heightened strict scrutiny for laws
that burden fundamental rights, undermine the political process, or
discriminate against discrete and insular minorities.209 During the reign of
Lochnerism, courts sometimes treated economic interests as close to
immutable.210 However, this view has been rejected and the modern view
is that economic regulations should be reviewed with minimal judicial
scrutiny.211
Courts have recognized that legislatures must, in the nature of their
work, make classifications.212 These classifications may sometimes
benefit one party over another.213 However, classifications based on race
or gender are not of the type that are desirable for the government to
See O’Reilly v. City of Hazelwood, 850 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
Long, supra note 10, at 745–46.
203
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make.214 Therefore, such classifications deserve a heightened scrutiny.215
In contrast, economic regulations, even ones tailored to the specific needs
of one group or locality, are necessary and at times desirable.216 Therefore,
when reviewing special laws courts should defer to the legislature. The
substantial justification test created too high of a standard of review for
the nature of the topics special laws regulate.217
Some scholars argue that due to gerrymandering and districting, state
legislatures are often the least majoritarian branch.218 On the other hand,
state judges or the governors that appoint them are elected by a statewide
election.219 Under this theory, the Countermajoritarian Difficulty is
lessened when judges strike down laws because the legislature is not
elected by a majority of the people.220 In some circumstances, judicial
intervention in striking down laws may even be enforcing majoritarian
principles.221 However, the role of the courts is not to create their own
policy.222 Fundamentally, the role of the legislature is to create laws,
especially economic laws.223 The role of the judiciary is to deferentially
review these laws and provide a countermajoritarian check on democratic
decision making.224 If the legislature has turned into a countermajoritarian
institution, the institution itself should be fixed. The solution should not
come from altering the fundamental role of the courts. If the solution to
the legislature turning into a countermajoritarian institution is giving the
judiciary more power, our democratic process will be undermined. Instead
of fixing the issue, our system of government would consist of two
countermajoritarian institutions- the legislature and the judiciary.
After Spectra, a law is only special if it does not apply equally to all
members of a given class and its disparate treatment of the class members
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has no rational basis.225 However, even if a law qualifies as a special law,
the legislature may still enact the law if it is not prohibited by Article III,
Sec. 40.226 While the court has committed to rational basis review, it needs
to further clarify how to implement this standard in the context of special
laws. There are two ways to apply rational basis review with respect to
special laws.227 One approach is to ask whether there is a rational basis
for the inclusion of a certain group.228 In contrast, courts could ask
whether there was a rational basis for what was excluded from the law.229
If the court interprets the rational basis test to ask whether there is a
rational basis for what is included in the law, the special laws provision
will effectively be read out of the Missouri Constitution. This is because
the legislature almost always finds some conceivable reason for creating
the law. The group included likely has some special characteristic that
makes the law favorable to them. Therefore, when framing the question
as whether the law meets the low bar of a rational basis for including a
group, the answer will almost always be yes. This will be true even when
a similar group would have also benefitted from legislation but was
excluded.
Instead, if the court looks at whether there is a rational basis for the
legislature excluding certain groups, the special laws provision will have
more force behind it. The analysis for whether the legislature had a
rational basis for excluding similar groups would force courts to explicitly
compare the groups that were excluded with what was included. In
contrast, if the court just looks at whether there is a rational basis for what
was included the court does not have to consider the excluded groups at
all. While rational basis is still a relatively low bar, the version of the
analysis that looks at what groups were excluded forces legislatures and
cities to ensure that they are including all groups that are similar and would
benefit from legislation instead of favoring just one group.

VI. CONCLUSION
Rational basis review, when used in a way that asks whether there is
an actual justifiable basis for the exclusion that honors the intentions of
the Missouri Constitutional Convention in including a provision restricting
225
Crestwood v. Affton Fire Protection Dist., 620 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Mo. 2021)
(en banc).
226
Id.; MO. CONST. art. III, § 40. The law also must comply with the notice
requirement in Art. III, Section 42. MO. CONST. art. III, § 40.
227
Blaske v Smith & Entzeroth, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822, 832 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
228
State v. Gilley 785 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
229
McKaig v. Kansas City, 256 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Mo. 1953) (en banc).
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special laws. This analysis strikes a balance between maintaining
deference to the legislature and the interest in protecting the people from
the disproportionate influence of wealthy minorities. Inquiring into the
class excluded from the law gives the court the opportunity to actually
inquire into whether it was reasonable to exclude a class from the statute
or whether the legislature granted unfair benefits to specific groups.
Courts should focus the review on whether there is a rational basis for the
groups that were excluded from the law. If there is no actual rational basis
for excluding similarly situated groups, then the law is an impermissible
special law.
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